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1 Introduction
The beginning of the 21st century is characterized by two fundamental demo-
graphic trends, which constitute the most recent corollaries of the demographic
transition started two centuries ago (Lee 2003).
On the one hand, the ageing process raises the proportion of elderly persons
in need of long-term care (LTC), i.e. persons who can no longer carry out simple
daily activities such as eating, washing, etc. The number of dependent elderly at
the European level (EU-27) is expected to grow from about 38 million people in
2010 to about 57 million in 2060 (EU 2012). As shown on Figure 1, the rise in the
number of dependent elderly persons is expected to be substantial in most large
European economies. The rise of LTC constitutes a major challenge for families,
since two thirds of LTC is provided informally (Norton 2000). Forecasts from
the EU suggest that a signicant part of LTC provision will remain informal in
the future. Given the limited development of private LTC insurance markets,
this constitutes also a major challenge for policy-makers.1
Figure 1: Number of dependent persons (total / relying on informal care and
cash benets), in thousands (source EU 2012)
On the other hand, our societies witness also, since the 1970s, a signicant
postponement of births (see Gustafsson 2001). Because of various reasons, such
as the rise in education, medical advances or cultural norms, individuals tend
to have their children later on in their life.2 To illustrate that trend, Figure 2
1On this, see Cremer et al (2012).
2On the various causes of birth postponement, see Cigno and Ermisch (1991) and Happel
et al (1984).
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shows the rise in the mean age at birth in di¤erent European countries. That
rise is substantial: whereas the mean age at birth was below 27 years in France
in the late 1970s, it is about 30 years today. The postponement of births has
also a signicant impact on the dynamics of the age-structure of the economy,
and, hence, may a¤ect the nancial sustainability of systems of intergenerational
trade, such as PAYG pensions schemes.
Figure 2: Mean age at birth (source: Human Fertility Database).
Although those two demographic trends may seem, at rst glance, to be
unrelated, those two phenomena are linked through various channels. First of
all, as already mentioned, a large volume of LTC services are informal, and
provided by the family. Hence the rise of the demand for LTC imposes some
pressure on the time constraints faced by other members of the family, such
as spouses and children. Given that the time dedicated to LTC cannot be
spent on other activities, such as working or educating ones children, LTC
makes time even more scarce for informal care givers. Secondly, the timing of
births chosen by parents determines the age gap between parents and children,
which constitutes a major determinant of the amount of LTC that children will
provide to their parents once those will reach the old age. More precisely, when
the caregivers are children of the dependent elderly, the age of caregivers has a
major impact on the opportunity cost of helping their elderly parents. Clearly,
the oldest child of the family is, when his parent becomes dependent, quite old
already, and close to retirement. Hence, for the rst children born in a family,
the opportunity cost of helping an elderly parent is lower. On the contrary,
younger children are, when their parent becomes dependent, younger, and are
not close to retire, implying a higher opportunity cost of providing LTC.
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Whereas those links may appear purely theoretical, empirical studies on
informal LTC suggest that informal LTC is far from a marginal phenomenon.
According to recent gures of the SCAN Foundation (2012), informal caregivers
spend, on average, 20.4 hours per week providing care. Moreover, the period
during which informal care is given is, on average, equal to 4.6 years. Thus
informal LTC really a¤ects time constraints in real life. Regarding the impact
of the age of children, recent studies, such as Fontaine et al (2007) showed, on the
basis of SHARE data, that the behavior of the children of a dependent parent
without spouse is far from symmetric, but, rather, varies with the age of the child
and his/her involvement in the labor market. In particular, if younger children
are working full time, older children tend to be more involved in the provision
of LTC to their elderly parent, even though younger children also participate
(in particular when their older brothers and sisters are strongly involved). Thus
the age (and, hence, working status) of children providing informal LTC to an
elderly parent seems to be an important variable, and this variable is directly
related to the fertility choices made by their parents when they were young.
The goal of this paper is precisely to reexamine the formal relations between,
on the one hand, the provision of informal LTC by children, and, on the other
hand, the timing of births, by paying a particular attention to the impact of
LTC on time constraints, and also to the unequal opportunity costs of providing
LTC among children of di¤erent ages. More precisely, we would like to examine
the conditions under which the timing of birth of children can be used by parents
as a kind of insurance device for LTC provision at the old age in an economy
where there exist no social insurance system, and where LTC is only provided
informally through children.
For that purpose, we develop a 4-period OLG model where individuals be-
come dependent at the old age (period 4), and require some temporal help from
their children. In order to discuss the fertility timing, we consider a model of
lifecycle fertility, where parents can choose to have children in two fertility peri-
ods (i.e. periods 2 and 3). We thus consider the joint of decisions of the timing
of births and of the provision of LTC to the elderly parents, within a dynamic
model of capital accumulation.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. Our model is rst used to examine,
at the laissez-faire, the relation between birth timing and LTC provision. The
question raised is the following: under which conditions can we rationalize what
we observe in the data, that is, that older children tend to provide more LTC
than younger children? We rst examine that issue at the temporary equilibrium
of the economy, and, then, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of the
economy, to examine to what extent our conclusions are robust to the economic
development process, which a¤ects the dynamics of the wages and interest rates,
and, hence, the opportunity cost of providing informal LTC for children. Then,
in a second stage, we propose to characterize the long-run social optimum, and
we examine the decentralization of that long-run social optimum by means of
appropriate policy instruments. Our question are: what does the optimal family
policy look like? Is the birth timing chosen by parents socially optimal in the
long-run? Is the postponement of births desirable in times of a rise in LTC?
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Anticipating on our results, we rst show that, at the laissez-faire, early
children provide, under mild conditions, more LTC to their elderly parents in
comparison to late children, because of a lower opportunity cost of helping their
parents. That tendency is shown to be persistent in the long-run. Then, we
characterize the long-run social optimum. We show that individuals have in
general, at the laissez-faire, too few children early in their life, and too many
children later on in their life in comparison with the social optimum. The
intuition behind that result lies in the fact that, in our model, parents do not
perfectly anticipate, when they plan the births of their children, that the chosen
birth timing will a¤ect the opportunity costs faced by their children when they
will provide LTC 50 or 60 years later, once they will be dependent. As a
consequence of this, the decentralization of the social optimum requires subsidies
on early births, in such a way as to encourage parents to have children early,
so as to minimize the opportunity cost of providing LTC in the future. When
considering the second-best problem (and focusing, for simplicity, on an open
economy where factor prices are taken as given), we show that the optimal
(uniform) subsidy on early births depends not only on standard equity and
e¢ ciency concerns, but aims also at internalizing population composition e¤ects,
as well as at encouraging the provision of LTC to the dependent parents.
As such, this paper pertains to several branches of the literature. First of
all, it complements the existing literature on LTC and family games. That
literature already emphasized the crucial role played by the age of children in
LTC provision, in particular when the child decides his geographical location
(see Konrad et al 2002; Wakabayashi and Horioka 2009). The present paper is
not about geographical location choices, but focuses on the di¤erences in the
time cost of providing LTC due to the proximity with the retirement period.
We also complement other papers on family games and LTC, such as Pezzin
et al (2007, 2009), which focus more on strategic motives for LTC provision,
without considering endogenous fertility choices. Secondly, our paper is also in
line with the literature focusing on fertility as insurance device in case of LTC
risk at the old ages (see Cremer et al 2013). Our contribution with respect to
that literature is to consider a particular aspect of fertility choices: the timing
of births. Thirdly, we also contribute to the literature on optimal public policy
under LTC (see Jousten et al 2005; Pestieau and Sato 2006, 2008; Cremer and
Pestieau 2010; Cremer and Roeder 2012). Those papers study various aspects
of the design of optimal LTC public insurance, but do not consider endogenous
fertility. Finally, we also complement the existing literature on childbearing
ages and the choice of optimal fertility prole in OLG models, such as dAlbis
et al (2012), and Pestieau and Ponthiere (2014, 2015). Our contribution with
respect to those papers is to highlight the e¤ects of birth timing decisions on
the informal provision of LTC in the long-run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Sec-
tion 2. The laissez-faire (temporary equilibrium and intertemporal equilibrium)
is studied in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the long-run social optimum.
The optimal family policy is derived in Section 5. The second-best optimal
policy is studied in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
We consider a four-period OLG model. The duration of each period is normal-
ized to 1. Each cohort is a continuum of individuals of size 1. Fertility is at the
replacement level, that is, one child per agent.
Period one is childhood. Period 2 is young adulthood, during which individ-
uals work, consume, save resources and can have nt children. Period 3 is older
adulthood, during which individuals work during a fraction of time z 2 ]0; 1[,
and enjoy a period of retirement of duration 1   z.3 During that period, in-
dividuals consume, save and can have 1   nt children. Period 4 is a period of
old-age dependency, during which individuals need long term care.
There exist two types of agents, depending on the age of their parent:
 Type-E agents: children born from young parents (i.e. "early" children)
 Type-L agents: children born from older parents (i.e."late" children).
Within the population of young adults at time t, the proportion of type E
agents t is denoted by qt (we have 0  qt  1). The proportion of agents of type
L is 1  qt.
Figure 3 illustrate the coexistence of agents of types E and L; those agents
di¤er regarding the age of their parents: while type-E individuals have younger
parents (i.e. the age-gap between them and their parents is low), type-L indi-
viduals have older parents (i.e. the age-gap between them and their parents is
higher). As a consequence of this, those agents will also di¤er in terms of age at
the time of providing informal help to their elderly dependent parents. Type-E
agents will be older when their parents will fall into dependency and will need
LTC. On the contrary, type-L agents will be younger and fully active when their
parents will become dependent.
2.1 Preferences
The preferences of a young adult of type i 2 fE;Lg are represented by the
following utility function:
u(cit) + v
 
nit

+ u(dit+1) + v(1  nit) + (ai) + '(biet+2) (1)
where cit is consumption at the young age, d
i
t+1 denotes consumption in third
period. ai is the informal temporal aid given to the parent. It is equal to aEt+1
for type E and to aLt for type L. Finally, b
ie
t+2 is the expected temporal aid
received from children at the old age. As usual, we assume u0 () > 0; u00 () <
0; v0 () > 0; v00 () < 0; 0 () > 0; 00 () < 0; '0 () > 0 and '00() < 0: The
3 In the rest of this paper, we treat z as an exogenous variable. This simplifying assumption
is made for the sake of analytical convenience. In order to assess the robustness of our results
to the level of z, we will, throughout the paper, discuss the impact of z on LTC provision.
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n births
1 - n births
Type E
Type L
Informal aid to the dependent parent
Figure 3: Type-E and Type-L agents in the OLG economy
parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the extent to which young individuals take into
account the impact of their fertility choices on future LTC received at the old
age. Full myopia corresponds to the case where  = 0, whereas  = 1 coincides
with the absence of myopia.
The expected total LTC received at the old age is the sum of the LTC
provided by each child:4
biet+2 = n
i
ta
Ee
t+2 + (1  nit)aLet+2 (2)
We assume here a perfect substitutability between the temporal aid received
from the early children and from the late children. The expected levels of tem-
poral aid received from each early child and from each late child, i.e. aEet+2
and aLet+2, are likely to di¤er. Actually, since the two types of children will,
because of the birth spacing, help their elderly parents at di¤erent points in
their life, they may not provide the same amount of LTC. Note, however, that
the expectations of parents may not fully reect this. Hence, when character-
izing the temporal equilibrium of our economy, we will condition this on given
expectations regarding aEet+2 and a
Le
t+2.
4We suppose here that LTC is only provided by the children of the elderly. In reality,
it could be the case that some grandchildren also take part to the provision of LTC. In our
model, this possibility could be taken into account by adding a third source of LTC, based on
the provision of the early children born from early children of the dependent. However, for
the sake of analytical convenience, we will focus here only on LTC provision by children, and
exclude grandchildren from the provision of LTC.
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2.2 Budget constraints
When an agent is of type E, his parent becomes dependent when he is in the
third period of his life. Hence, he provides aid to his dependent parent when
being an old adult, that is, we have aEt = 0 and a
E
t+1 > 0. Hence, assuming that
a child costs a fraction  in terms of time, the resource constraints are:
wt
 
1  nEt

= cEt + s
E
t (3)
wet+1z(1  (1  nEt )  aEt+1) +Ret+1sEt = dEt+1 (4)
where wt is the hourly wage earned at time t, wet+1 is the expected wage rate at
time t+ 1, while Ret+1 is equal to one plus the expected interest rate prevailing
at time t+ 1. The associated intertemporal budget constraint is:
wt
 
1  nEt

+
wet+1z(1  (1  nEt )  aEt+1)
Ret+1
= cEt +
dEt+1
Ret+1
(5)
When an agent is of type L, his parent becomes dependent when he is in the
second period of his life. Hence, he provides aid to his dependent parent when
being a young adult, that is, we have aLt > 0 and a
L
t+1 = 0. Hence, the resource
constraints are:
wt(1  nLt   aLt ) = cLt + sLt (6)
wet+1z
 
1  (1  nLt )

+Ret+1s
L
t = d
L
t+1 (7)
The unique di¤erence between the two sets of budget constraints lies in the mo-
ment of life at which children help their elderly parents. In the hypothetical case
where there was no help (i.e. aEt+1 = a
L
t = 0), the two sets of budget constraints
would be the same across types E and L. The associated intertemporal budget
constraint is:
wt(1  nLt   aLt ) +
wet+1z
 
1  (1  nLt )

Ret+1
= cLt +
dLt+1
Ret+1
(8)
From those constraints, it can be seen that the two types of children do not
face the same opportunity cost of helping their dependent parents, since the
age at which they have to help their parents is not the same: early children
provide LTC later on in their life, unlike late children, who provide LTC earlier
in their life. Hence, although all agents have the same preferences, they will not
necessarily behave in the same way, since agents face di¤erent time and budget
constraints depending on whether they are early children or late children.
2.3 Production
The production process involves capital Kt and labour Lt, and exhibits constant
returns to scale:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) (9)
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The total labor force is made of young and old adults of types E and L:
Lt = qt
 
1  nEt

+ (1  qt)
 
1  nLt   aLt

+qt 1z(1  aEt   (1  nEt 1)) + (1  qt 1)z
 
1  (1  nLt 1)

(10)
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is full depreciation of capital after
one period of use. Hence capital accumulates according to the law:
Kt+1 = qts
E
t + (1  qt)sLt (11)
As usual, factors are paid at their marginal productivity:
wt = FL (Kt; Lt) (12)
Rt = FK (Kt; Lt) (13)
where wt is the wage rate and Rt equals 1 plus the interest rate.
3 The laissez-faire
Let us now consider how individuals of the two types will make their decisions
in terms of consumption, fertility and parental help. For that purpose, we will
rst consider the temporary equilibrium, which is a situation where each agent
maximizes his utility, conditionally on his beliefs regarding future production
factor prices (i.e. wet+1 and R
e
t+1) and conditionally on his beliefs regarding the
future help received from the children born early and late (i.e. aEet+2 and a
Le
t+2).
For the sake of simplication, we will assume, in the rest of this section, that all
agents, whatever these are of type E or L, formulate exactly the same beliefs
regarding future factor prices and future help received at the old age.
3.1 Temporary equilibrium
Conditionally on their anticipations, individuals of type E solve the following
problem:
max
cEt ;d
E
t+1n
E
t ;a
E
t+1
u(cEt ) + v
 
nEt

+ u(dEt+1) + v
 
1  nEt

+ (aEt+1) + '(n
E
t a
Ee
t+2 + (1  nEt )aLet+2)
s.t. wt
 
1  nEt

+
wet+1z(1  (1  nEt )  aEt+1)
Ret+1
= cEt +
dEt+1
Ret+1
First-order conditions (FOCs) yield:
u0(cEt ) = R
e
t+1u
0(dEt+1) (14)
v0
 
nEt
  v0  1  nEt + '0(bEet+2)  aEet+2   aLet+2 = u0(cEt ) wt   wet+1zRet+1

(15)
0(aEt+1) = u
0(cEt )
wet+1z
Ret+1
(16)
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The rst condition in those FOCs is the standard Euler equation, relating
present and future consumption. The second condition characterizes the optimal
birth timing. It says that the birth timing is optimally chosen when the marginal
welfare gain from increasing the number of early births (LHS of the condition,
which is decreasing in nEt ) is exactly equal to the marginal welfare loss from
increasing early births (RHS of the condition). Note that the LHS of that
condition depends on the di¤erence in terms of the expected LTC received at the
old age, depending on the type of child (third term of the LHS). When parents
anticipate equal help from early and late children, i.e. aEet+2 = a
Le
t+2, that term
vanishes. If, on the contrary, parents expect to receive more help from their
early children, i.e. aEet+2 > a
Le
t+2, this increases the marginal welfare gain from
having early children ceteris paribus. Hence, for an equal RHS, this leads to a
rise in the optimal level of early children nEt . Inversely, the beliefs a
Ee
t+2 < a
Le
t+2
reduces the marginal welfare from from having early children, inviting, ceteris
paribus, later births (i.e. a smaller nEt ). The last FOC characterizes the optimal
level of aid provided to the parent. In case of early children, the marginal welfare
loss of helping their elderly parent (RHS) is increasing with the retirement age
z. Later retirement raises the opportunity cost of helping the elderly.
Individuals of type L solve the following problem:
max
cLt ;d
L
t+1n
L
t ;a
L
t
u(cLt ) + v
 
nLt

+ u(dLt+1) + v
 
1  nLt

+ (aLt ) + '(n
L
t a
Ee
t+2 + (1  nLt )aLet+2)
s.t. wt(1  nLt   aLt ) +
wet+1z
 
1  (1  nLt )

Ret+1
= cLt +
dLt+1
Ret+1
FOCs are:
u0(cLt ) = R
e
t+1u
0(dLt+1) (17)
v0
 
nLt
  v0  1  nLt + '0(bLet+2)  aEet+2   aLet+2 = u0(cLt ) wt   wet+1zRet+1

(18)
0(aLt ) = u
0(cLt )wt (19)
The comparison of the FOCs for the two types of young individuals reveals
several things. First, the slope of the consumption prole is the same across
agents; but the levels of the consumption proles can vary across types. Sec-
ond, the condition for optimal fertility timing is the same across agents. Hence,
given that those agents face the same market prices, the unique di¤erence in
birth timing will come from di¤erences in the consumption proles. Individu-
als with larger consumption at the young age exhibit a lower marginal utility
of consumption, which reduces the marginal welfare loss associated with early
births (RHS), which encourages advancing births. On the contrary, individuals
with a lower consumption at the young age exhibit a larger marginal welfare
loss of early births, which encourages birth postponement. Thirdly, the RHS
of the condition for optimal help to the elderly parent is also di¤erent from its
counterpart for type-E agents. Under the assumption
wet+1z
Ret+1
< wt, late children
face, ceteris paribus (i.e. for a given consumption), a higher marginal welfare
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loss from helping their parents. As shown below, the lower opportunity cost
of helping the elderly explains why early children provide, at the laissez-faire,
more LTC than late children.
Proposition 1 Given the anticipated levels of future production factor prices
wet+1 and R
e
t+1, as well as the anticipated levels of future LTC received from the
children aEet+2 and a
Le
t+2, the temporary equilibrium is a vector

cEt ; d
E
t+1; n
E
t ; a
E
t+1; c
L
t ; d
L
t+1; n
L
t ; a
L
t ; wt
	
satisfying the conditions:
u0(cEt ) = R
e
t+1u
0(dEt+1)
v0
 
nEt
  v0  1  nEt + '0(bEet+2)  aEet+2   aLet+2 = u0(cEt ) wt   wet+1zRet+1

0(aEt+1) = u
0(cEt )
wet+1z
Ret+1
u0(cLt ) = R
e
t+1u
0(dLt+1)
v0
 
nLt
  v0  1  nLt + '0(bLet+2)  aEet+2   aLet+2 = u0(cLt ) wt   wet+1zRet+1

0(aLt ) = u
0(cLt )wt
wt = FL (Kt; Lt)
Under the assumption
wet+1z
Ret+1
< wt, individuals of type E provide, in compar-
ison with type-L individuals, a larger amount of LTC to their elderly parents,
they consume also more and have more early children than type-L individuals:
aEt+1 > a
L
t
cEt > c
L
t
dEt+1 > d
L
t+1
nEt > n
L
t
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that, provided
wet+1z
Ret+1
< wt, individuals born from young
parents provide, at the laissez-faire, more LTC to the dependent parents, in
comparison with individuals born from older parents. This result is obtained
from the simple fact that early children are older at the time their parents
become dependent, and, hence, face, under that condition, a lower opportunity
cost of helping them, in comparison to late children. Hence they provide a larger
amount of informal LTC to their parents.
That result can be related to the existing empirical literature on LTC in-
formal provision. Clearly, if we compare the aid provided by two children of
the same parent, i.e. aEt and a
L
t , we obtain that, under
wtz
Rt
< wt or zRt < 1,
the elderly dependent parent will receive more help from his older children.
That theoretical prediction is consistent with the empirical literature on infor-
mal LTC provision, which shows that the amount of informal care provided by
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older children tends to exceed the amount of care provided by younger children
when younger children are still working full time whereas older children are not
(Fontaine et al 2007).
Note that the size of the inequality in informal help depends on the level
of the interest rate, and, more importantly, on the retirement age. A lower
retirement age (a lower z) tends to raise inequalities in informal LTC provided
between early and late children. Indeed, in that case, the opportunity cost
of providing LTC to the dependent parent is much lower for early children in
comparison with late children. On the contrary, if z is close to 1, the inequality
becomes less sizeable. However, even in the case where z = 1, we still have,
under
wet+1
Ret+1
< wt, that early children provide more LTC than late children.
Thus the level of z only a¤ects the size of the gap in terms of LTC, without, in
general, a¤ecting the main prediction of the model, which is that early children
tend to provide more LTC than late children.
Finally, it should be stressed that the di¤erences in the behavior of the two
types of agents concern not only the LTC provision, but, also the fertility timing.
As stated in Proposition 1, early children tend to have a larger proportion of
children born early in life, whereas late children tend to have a larger proportion
of children born later on in life. Those results come merely from the di¤erent
time constraints faced by the two types of agents. Type-E children must provide
LTC to their elderly parents when they are mature, and this leaves them plenty
of time to have more children when they are younger. On the contrary, type-L
children must provide LTC to their parents when they are young adults, and
this encourages them to postpone births later on in their life.5
3.2 Intertemporal equilibrium
Up to now, we focused on the temporary equilibrium of the economy. Note
that whether early children tend to provide a larger informal help than late
children depends signicantly on the relative levels of wages and interest rates.
However, those factor prices are likely to evolve over time. Hence it makes sense
to study the intertemporal equilibrium of the economy, to see how the relative
levels of factor prices will evolve over time. In this section, we will characterize
the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight.
The intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence of tem-
porary equilibria for a given initial capital stock K0, sequence satisfying the
following capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1 = qts
E
t + (1  qt)sLt (20)
5Note that the social reproduction process at work in our model (i.e. early children tend
to have more children early, whereas late children tend to have more children later on in their
life) is not the product of social or family norms. On the contrary, this reproduction is dictated
by rationality. Parents, by choosing the age at which they have their children, determine the
age gap between them and their descendants, which will constraint these in all their choices
(through the time constraints), including fertility choices. Thus our simple model of rational
choices can mimic social reproduction behaviors.
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as well as the conditions:
wet+1 = wt+1 = FL (Kt+1; Lt+1) (21)
Ret+1 = Rt+1 = FK (Kt+1; Lt+1) (22)
aEet+2 = a
E
t+2 (23)
aLet+2 = a
L
t+2 (24)
At intertemporal equilibrium, the labor market clears:
Lt =

qt
 
1  nEt

+ (1  qt)
 
1  nLt   aLt

+qt 1z(1  aEt   (1  nEt 1)) + (1  qt 1)z
 
1  (1  nLt 1)
  (25)
as well as the market for goods:
F (K;Lt) = qtc
E
t + (1  qt)cLt + qt 1dEt + (1  qt 1)dLt +Kt+1 (26)
At the intertemporal equilibrium, the FOCs relative to individualsutility
maximization problems are also satised:
u0(cEt ) = Rt+1u
0(dEt+1)
v0
 
nEt
  v0  1  nEt + '0(bEt+2)  aEt+2   aLt+2 = u0(cEt ) wt   wt+1zRt+1

0(aEt+1) = u
0(cEt )
wt+1z
Rt+1
u0(cLt ) = Rt+1u
0(dLt+1)
v0
 
nLt
  v0  1  nLt + '0(bLt+2)  aEt+2   aLt+2 = u0(cLt ) wt   wt+1zRt+1

0(aLt ) = u
0(cLt )wt
Similarly, rms maximize their prots, so that the following conditions hold:
wt = FL (Kt; )
Rt = FK (Kt; )
Finally, the proportion of individuals of type E in each cohort follows the
dynamic law:
qt =
qt 1nEt 1 + (1  qt 1)nLt 1 
qt 1nEt 1 + (1  qt 1)nLt 1

+ qt 2(1  nEt 2) + (1  qt 2)(1  nLt 2)
(27)
3.3 Stationary equilibrium
Let us now consider a stationary equilibrium. At the stationary equilibrium, the
economy perfectly reproduces itself over time. The capital stock is constant, the
composition of the population in the two types is constant, consumptions are
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constant over time, and informal care to the dependent parents is also constant
over time, meaning that what a child of a given type gives to his dependent
parent is exactly equal to the aid that person will receive from a child of the
same type as himself at the old age.
At steady-state, the following conditions are satised (time indexes are
dropped):
K = qsE + (1  q)sL
L =

q
 
1  nE+ (1  q)  1  nL   aL
+qz(1  aE   (1  nE)) + (1  q)z  1  (1  nL)

That condition can be rewritten as:
L = q
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE+ 1  nL  aL + z  z+ znL
The resource constraint of the economy is thus:
F (K;L) = q
 
cE + dE

+ (1  q)  cL + dL+K
Factors are paid at their marginal productivity:
w = FL
 
K;

q
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE+ 1  nL   aL + z   z + znL
R = FK
 
K;

q
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE+ 1  nL   aL + z   z + znL
Both types of agents maximize their lifetime welfare subject to their in-
tertemporal budget constraints:
u0(cE) = Ru0(dE)
v0
 
nE
  v0  1  nE+ '0(nEaE + (1  nE)aL)  aE   aL = u0(cE) hw   wz
R
i
0(aE) = u0(cE)
wz
R
u0(cL) = Ru0(dL)
v0
 
nL
  v0  1  nL+ '0(nLaE + (1  nL)aL)  aE   aL = u0(cL) hw   wz
R
i
0(aL) = u0(cL)w
Regarding the long-run composition of the population, imposing qt = qt 1 =
qt 2 in the condition:
qt =
 
qt 1nE + (1  qt 1)nL

(qt 1nE + (1  qt 1)nL) + qt 2(1  nE) + (1  qt 2)(1  nL)
yields:
q =
nL
1  nE + nL
The following proposition summarizes key features of the stationary equilib-
rium in our economy.
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Proposition 2 The stationary equilibrium is a vector

cE ; dE ; nE ; aE ; cL; dL; nL; aL;K; q
	
satisfying the conditions:
u0(cE) = Ru0(dE)
v0
 
nE
  v0  1  nE+ '0(nEaE + (1  nE)aL)  aE   aL = u0(cE)w h1  z
R
i
0(aE) = u0(cE)
wz
R
u0(cL) = Ru0(dL)
v0
 
nL
  v0  1  nL+ '0(nLaE + (1  nL)aL)  aE   aL = u0(cL)w h1  z
R
i
0(aL) = u0(cL)w
K =
q
 
w
 
1  nE  cE
+(1  q)  w  1  nL   aL  cL
q =
nL
1  nE + nL
At the stationary equilibrium, and assuming zR < 1, individuals of type E
provide a larger amount of LTC to their elderly parents, in comparison with
type-L individuals. They also consume more and have a larger proportion of
early births:
aE > aL
cE > cL
dE > dL
nE > nL
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the tendency of early children to provide more
LTC to their elderly parent in comparison to late children is not a short-run
phenomenon. Actually, in the long-run, we nd, under the general condition
z
R < 1, the same tendency. Note that, since at the stationary equilibrium the
wage rate is constant over time, the relative gap in the opportunity cost of
providing LTC to the elderly parents is even larger here that at the temporary
equilibrium, where, under capital accumulation, we have wt+1 > wt, which
raises the cost of helping the elderly for early children. Thus, the tendency of
early children to provide more LTC to their elderly dependent parents is not a
temporary tendency, but is even reinforced in the long-run.
Note also that, even if we considered the case where individuals work fully
in their third period (i.e. z = 1), the condition stated in Proposition 2 would
still hold, provided R > 1, which is a weak assumption. Hence, the fact that
early children provide more LTC than late children is robust to the postulated
retirement age. However, it remains true that the level of z a¤ects the size of
the gap between the amounts of LTC provided by the di¤erent types of children,
since a lower z reduces the opportunity cost of helping parents for early children.
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4 Long-run social optimum
Let us now characterize the long-run social optimum. For that purpose, we will
consider the standard utilitarian social welfare function. The goal of the social
planner is here to select consumption, fertility and informal LTC variables, as
well as some stock of capital, to maximize the lifetime welfare prevailing at the
stationary equilibrium.6
The social planning problem of the utilitarian planner di¤ers from the prob-
lems faced by agents in several important dimensions. First, the social planner
considers the maximization of social welfare in the long run (i.e. at the station-
ary equilibrium), and considers thus a time horizon quite di¤erent from the ones
faced by individuals. Second, the social planner does not su¤er from myopia,
so that  is set to 1 in the social planning problem. Besides those classical
di¤erences, another, more original di¤erence concerns the fact that the social
planner takes into account the impact of fertility choices on the composition of
the population in the long-run. In other words, the social planner internalizes
compositional externalities related to individual fertility choices.
The problem of the social planner can be written by means of the following
Lagrangian:
max
cE ;dE ;aE ;nE
cL;dL;aL;nL;K
nL
1 nE+nL

u(cE) + v(nE) + u(dE) + v(1  nE) + '  nEaE + (1  nE)aL+ (aE)
+ 1 n
E
1 nE+nL

u(cL) + v(nL) + u(dL) + v(1  nL) + '  nLaE + (1  nL)aL+ (aL)
+
"
F

K;
h
nL
1 nE+nL
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE+ 1  nL   aL + z   z + znLi
  nL
1 nE+nL
 
cE + dE
  1 nE
1 nE+nL
 
cL + dL
 K
#
FOCs for consumptions are: :
u0(cE) = u0(cL) = u0(dE) = u0(dL) =  (28)
The social optimum involves thus an equalization of consumption levels across
time periods and across types.
The FOC for K is:
FK
 
K;
"
nL
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE
1  nE + nL + 1  n
L   aL + z   z + znL
#!
= 1
(29)
This condition is the standard Golden Rule of capital accumulation (Phelps
1961), in the case where there is no cohort growth and where there is full
depreciation of capital.
6Note that the social planner keeps the retirement age z as given. One can thus interpret
z as xed by some external constraints (e.g. biological constraints).
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The FOCs for aE and aL are:
nL
1  nE + nL

'0()nE + 0(aE)+ 1  nE
1  nE + nL'
0 ()nL
= FL (K; )

znL
1  nE + nL

(30)
1  nE
1  nE + nL

'0 () (1  nL) + 0(aL)+ 1  nE
1  nE + nL'
0 ()nL
= FL (K; )

1  nE
1  nE + nL

(31)
Further simplications yield:
'0()nE + 0(aE) + '0 ()  1  nE = u0(c)FL (K; ) z (32)
'0 ()nL + 0(aL) + '0 () (1  nL) = u0(c)FL (K; ) (33)
The LHS is the marginal social welfare gain from helping the elderly parents,
whereas the RHS is the marginal social welfare loss from providing LTC. Ob-
viously, that loss depends on how large the marginal productivity of labour
is. Moreover, the marginal social welfare loss from providing LTC is larger for
individuals of type L than for individuals of type E.
The FOCs for nE and nL are:
nL
(1  nE + nL)2

u(cE) + v(nE) + u(dE) + v(1  nE) + '  nEaE + (1  nE)aL+ (aE)
  u(cL) + v(nL) + u(dL) + v(1  nL) + '  nLaE + (1  nL)aL+ (aL)

+
nL
1  nE + nL

v0(nE)  v0(1  nE) + '0 ()  aE   aL
+u0(c)FL (K; )
"
nL
 
nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE
(1  nE + nL)2 +
 nL (   z)
1  nE + nL
#
+u0(c)

  n
L
(1  nE + nL)2
 
cE + dE
   nL
(1  nE + nL)2
 
cL + dL

= 0 (34)
and
1  nE
(1  nE + nL)2

u(cE) + v(nE) + u(dE) + v(1  nE) + '  nEaE + (1  nE)aL+ (aE)
  u(cL) + v(nL) + u(dL) + v(1  nL) + '  nLaE + (1  nL)aL+ (aL)

+
1  nE
1  nE + nL

v0(nL)  v0(1  nL) + '0 ()  aE   aL
+u0(c)FL (K; )
"
(1  nE)  nL (   z)  nE (   z) + aL   zaE
(1  nE + nL)2 +
nL (   z)
1  nE + nL    + z
#
+u0(c)
"
  1  n
E
(1  nE + nL)2
 
cE + dE
   (1  nE)
(1  nE + nL)2
 
cL + dL
#
= 0 (35)
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Further simplications yield:
v0(nE)  v0(1  nE) + '0 ()  aE   aL
=  u0(c)FL (K; )
" 
aL   zaE  (   z)
(1  nE + nL)
#
 

u(cE) + v(nE) + u(dE) + v(1  nE) + '  nEaE + (1  nE)aL+ (aE)
  u(cL) + v(nL) + u(dL) + v(1  nL) + '  nLaE + (1  nL)aL+ (aL)

(1  nE + nL) (36)
while the FOC for nL becomes:
v0(nL)  v0(1  nL) + '0 ()  aE   aL
=  u0(c)FL (K; )
" 
aL   zaE  (   z)
(1  nE + nL)
#
 

u(cE) + v(nE) + u(dE) + v(1  nE) + '  nEaE + (1  nE)aL+ (aE)
  u(cL) + v(nL) + u(dL) + v(1  nL) + '  nLaE + (1  nL)aL+ (aL)

(1  nE + nL) (37)
Note that the two conditions have the same RHS. Hence we have:
v0(nE)  v0(1  nE) + '0  nEaE + (1  nE)aL  aE   aL
= v0(nL)  v0(1  nL) + '0  nLaE + (1  nL)aL  aE   aL
Denote the function present in the LHS and RHS by  (x)  v0(x)  v0(1 
x) + '0
 
xaE + (1  x)aL  aE   aL. We have  0(x) < 0 on the interval [0; 1]
for aE 7 aL. Given that the function  (x) is strictly monotone, and that
it appears on both sides of the above condition, it must be the case that its
argument must take the same value on both sides. From which it follows that,
at the social optimum, we have equal fertility across types:
nE = nL = n (38)
Hence, the optimal long-run proportion of early children is:
q =
n
1  n+ n = n (39)
In the light of this, the FOC for n becomes:
v0(n)  v0(1  n) + '0  naE + (1  n)aL  aE   aL
= u0(c)FL (K; )

 (1  z)   aL   zaE  (aE)  (aL) (40)
The LHS of that condition is similar to the LHS of the condition for fertility at
the laissez-faire. However, the RHS di¤ers rst by the fact that R = 1 at the
18
social optimum, and by the addition of two terms:  u0(c)FL (K; )

aL   zaE
and   (aE)  (aL).
Therefore, the FOCs for informal LTC become:
0(aE) = u0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL (41)
0(aL) = u0(c)FL (K; )  '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL (42)
The last term of RHS is the same. First term identical up to z. Under z < 1,
we have 0(aE) < 0(aL), implying aE > aL. Hence, at the long-run social
optimum, early children should provide more help to their elderly parents than
late children. Thus, it is not only the case that early children provide more
LTC to their parents in comparison to late children at the laissez-faire; it is also
the case, under a utilitarian social welfare function, that early children should
provide more LTC than late children. Note, however, that, in the extreme case
where individuals work fully in their third period (i.e. z = 1), then it would be
socially optimal that both types of children provide the same amount of LTC
to their parents.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 The long-run social optimum is a vector

cE; cL; dE; dL; aE; aL; nE; nL;K; q
	
such that:
cE = cL = dE = dL = c
nE = nL = n
v0(n)  v0(1  n) + '0 ()  aE   aL = u0(c)FL (K; )  (1  z)   aL   zaE  (aE)  (aL)
FK (K
; ) = 1
0(aE) = u0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0 ()
0(aL) = u0(c)FL (K; )  '0 ()
0(aL)  0(aE) = u0(c)FL (K; ) (1  z) > 0 =) aE > aL if z < 1.
q = n
Proof. See above.
At the utilitarian social optimum, early and late children should have the
same life in terms of consumption patterns and fertility patterns. The unique
di¤erence is that early children should provide a larger LTC than late children.
The intuition goes as follows: from the perspective of social welfare, it is better
to ask early children to provide more LTC, since the social opportunity cost of
helping their elderly parent is lower for them, as long as z < 1. Note that the
gap between aE and aL depends on how large the retirement age is. When z
is low, the aid gap is large, whereas, when z is close to 1 (i.e. late retirement),
the aid gap becomes tiny.
Having characterized the social optimum, let us now compare it with the
stationary equilibrium achieved at the laissez-faire. Proposition 3 summarizes
our ndings.
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Proposition 4 Comparing the laissez-faire (i) with the social optimum (i),
we obtain:
 Ki 7 Kiwhen R ? 1 prevails at the laissez-faire.
 ci = di, whereas ci 7 di when R ? 1 prevails at the laissez-faire.
 If
u0(cE)FL (K; ) z
FK (K; ) > u
0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
u0(cL)FL (K; ) > u0(c)FL (K; )  '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
we have:
aE > aE and aL > aL
 And if
u0(ci)FL (K; )

1  zR

 '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL ? u
0(c)FL (K; )

 (1  z)   aL   zaE
  (aE)  (aL)
 '0  naE + (1  n)aL  aE   aL
we have:
nE ? nE and nL ? nL
Proof. See the Appendix.
The social optimum exhibits several important di¤erences in comparison
with the laissez-faire. First, it exhibits a di¤erent level of capital, as well as
at consumption proles, unlike at the laissez-faire. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, the long-run social optimum exhibits, under mild conditions, a larger
proportion of early births in comparison with the laissez-faire, as well as a lower
proportion of late births. The underlying intuition goes as follows. The mar-
ginal social welfare loss associated to the informal provision of LTC is larger
among late children than among early children. But at the laissez-faire, parents
do not take this into account when deciding the timing of births. This explains
why they tend to make too many late births in comparison with what is so-
cially optimal. Thirdly, another important di¤erence between the laissez-faire
and the social optimum concerns the amount of LTC provision. Individuals
of both types tend to provide, under weak conditions, too little LTC to their
elderly parents, in comparison with the social optimum. The intuition is here
that young individuals do not, when choosing the amount of help, take into
account the welfare gains this generates among the dependent elderly. On the
contrary, the social planner takes those gains into account, and this leads to a
larger amount of informal aid.
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5 Decentralization and optimal policy
Let us now examine how the long-run social optimum can be decentralized.
For that purpose, we design policy instruments in such a way that individual
decisions at the laissez-faire would, under those policy instrument, lead to the
social optimum. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 The long-run social optimum can be decentralized by means of
the following instruments:
 A system of intergenerational transfers allowing the capital stock to reach
its optimal level K.
 Intra-generational lump-sum transfers allowing the equalization of con-
sumption levels across types E and L.
 Subsidies on early births E and Lequal to:
i = FL (K; )
 
aL   zaE+ (aE)  (aL)
u0(c)
+
 
aE   aL '0  naE + (1  n)aL  '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL
u0(c)
 Subsidies on informal aid to the elderly parents equal to:
E = L =
'0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
u0(c)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 states that the decentralization of the long-run social optimum
requires to subsidize early births, in such a way as to induce parents to advance
births in a way compatible with long-run social welfare maximization. The
decentralization of the long-run social optimum also requires some subsidies
on the help provided to the elderly parents. The intuition goes as follows.
Individuals help their parents at the laissez-faire, but their help is purely driven
by their own interests. However, the dependent parents benet a lot from the
help provided by their children. The social planner takes into account those
welfare gains, and subsidize childrens help to an extent that depends on those
welfare gains. Note that the health status of the dependent may strongly a¤ect
the level of the derivative '0 (). If the health status is so bad that childrens
help does not make them better o¤, i.e. '0 ()  0, then the subsidy should
be very low. Thus the public subsidy fully internalizes the welfare externalities
induced by childrens provision of LTC.
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6 The second-best problem
As shown above, the decentralization of the rst-best social optimum requires
various kinds of policy instruments, some of these being hardly available in real
life. In this section, we propose to explore the decentralization of the second-
best social optimum, that is, under a limited set of available policy instruments.
For that purpose, we will consider an economy at the stationary equilibrium, at
which q = n
L
1 nE+nL and 1   q = 1 n
E
1 nE+nL . Moreover, given that our interest
lies mainly on the design of family policy, we will consider here, for the sake of
simplicity, that the economy is open, so that wages and interest rates are xed.7
We will consider three policy instruments: a tax on labour earnings  , a
demogrant T and a subsidy on early children . The last instrument can be
used by the government to reduce the cost of early children. For the sake of
analytical convenience, the cost of children is here dened in terms of goods
(and not in terms of time, as in the previous sections).
6.1 Laissez faire
Under those policy instruments, parents of types E and L choose savings si,
informal LTC ai and fertility ni and 1  ni conditionally on policy instruments
 , T and . In what follows, we assume complete myopia of agents, namely
 = 0. This makes the analysis simpler, but it does not change the qualitative
nature of results compared to a case of partial myopia (0 <  < 1).
Type Es problem is:
maxsE ;nE ;aE u
 
w(1  )  sE   nE(1  ) + T 
+u
 
zw(1  )(1  aE) + sE   (1  nE)
+v(nE) + v(1  nE) + (aE)
FOCs are:
u0(cE) = u0(dE) (43)
u0(cE)(1  ) = v0(nE)  v0(1  nE) (44)
u0(dE)zw(1  ) = 0(aE) (45)
Consumption is smoothed along the life cycle. The subsidy on early births tends
to encourage earlier births. The last FOC concern the informal LTC provided
to the elderly.
Type Ls problem is:
maxsL;nL;aL u
 
w(1  )(1  aL)  sL   nL(1  ) + T 
+u
 
zw(1  ) + sL   (1  nL)
+v(nL) + v(1  nL) + (aL)
7We also suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that R = 1.
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FOCs are:
u0(cL) = u0(dL) (46)
u0(cL)(1  ) = v0(nL)  v0(1  nL) (47)
u0(cL)w(1  ) = 0(aL) (48)
Those conditions are similar to the ones of agents of type E, except regarding
the marginal cost of providing informal LTC to the dependent parents, which
is here larger (given z < 1).
6.2 Second best solution
Let us now consider the second-best social planning problem. Under the pres-
ence of instruments  ,  and T , the social planner chooses the optimal levels of
savings, fertility and long term care for both types of agents.
The demand functions obtained from the laissez-faire are, for i 2 fE;Lg:
si = si( ; ; T )
ni = ni( ; ; T )
ai = ai( ; ; T )
The second-best planning problem can be written as the following Lagrangian:
$ = q[u
 
w(1  )  sE   nE(1  ) + T + u  wz(1  )(1  aE) + sE   (1  nE)
+v(nE) + v(1  nE) + (aE) + '(b^E)]
+(1  q)[u  w(1  )(1  aL)  sL   nL(1  ) + T + u  wz(1  ) + sL   (1  nL)
+v(nL) + v(1  nL) + (aL) + '(b^L)]
+


 
q
 
w + (1  aE)zw+ (1  q)(w(1  aL) + zw    qnE + (1  q)(nL)  T 
where b^i = aEni + aL(1  n)i and q = nL
1+nL nE .
Using the envelope theorem and the laissez-faire FOCs, we obtain:
@$
@si
= 0 (49)
@$
@aE
= q'0(b^E)nE + (1  q)'0(b^L)nL   qzw (50)
@$
@aL
= (1  q)'0(b^L)  1  nL+ q'0(b^E)(1  nE)  (1  q)w (51)
@$
@nE
=

UE   UL + w  aL   zaE @q
@nE
+ q'0(b^E)(aE   aL)
 

q + (nE   nL) @q
@nE

(52)
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@$
@nL
=

UE   UL + w  aL + zaE @q
@nL
+ (1  q)'0(b^L)(aE   aL)
 

1  q + (nE   nL) @q
@nL

(53)
6.3 Earning tax
Let us introduce the following notations (using the expectation operator E):
y = w (q + (1  q) (1  aL)) + wz  q(1  aE) + (1  q)
Eu0 = q

u0(cE) + u0(dE)

+ (1  q) u0(cL) + u0(dL)
Eu0y = q

u0(cE)w + u0(dE)zw(1  aE)+ (1  q) u0(cL)w(1  aL) + u0(dL)zw
In order to derive the formula for the optimal tax rate  , we consider the
derivatives of the compensated Lagrangian with respect to that scal instru-
ment. That derivative amounts to the e¤ect of a marginal change of  on the
Lagrangian when the change in  is compensated by a variation in T , in such a
way as to maintain the governments budget balanced.
Assuming that cross derivatives in compensated terms are negligible (i.e.
@~nE
@ =
@~nL
@ =
@~aE
@ =
@~aL
@ = 0), that derivative can be written as:
@ ~$
@
=
@$
@
+
@$
@T
y =  cov(u0; y) +A  w

qz
@~aE
@
+ (1  q)@~a
L
@

(54)
where
A  @~a
E
@
h
q'0(b^E)nE + (1  q)'0(b^L)nL
i
+
@~aL
@
h
q'0(b^E)(1  nE) + (1  q)'0(b^L)(1  nL)
i
and
@~ai
@
 @a
i
@
+
@ai
@T
@T
@
=
@ai
@
+
@ai
@T
y
is the e¤ect of a change of  on the amount of LTC provided by type-i agents to
their elderly parents when that change in  is compensated by a variation in the
demogrant T in such a way as to maintain the governments budget balanced.
Equalizing @
~$
@ to 0 and isolating  yields the following tax formula:
 =
 cov(u0; y) +A
w
h
qz @~a
E
@ + (1  q)@~a
L
@
i (55)
To interpret that earning tax formula, we can distinguish between three
terms. The rst term of the numerator is an equity term. Given that individuals
with higher incomes benet from a lower marginal utility of consumption, we
have cov(u0; y) < 0, so that this rst term is positive, and pushes towards a
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higher earning tax. The second term of the numerator, A, captures the incidence
of the earning tax on the provision of informal LTC by children. By taxing labor
earnings, the opportunity cost of providing informal LTC to elderly parents is
reduced, which is likely to raise the amount of LTC provided. That term pushes
towards more taxation of labor. Finally, the denominator of the tax formula is
a standard e¢ ciency term, which captures the incidence of the tax on the tax
base.
6.4 Family allowances
Let us now derive the formula for the subsidy on early children . For that
purpose, we will use the following notations:
nE = 
 
qnE + (1  q)nL
Eu0E = qu
0(cE) + (1  q)u0(cL)
Eu0EnE = 
 
qnEu0(cE) + (1  q)nLu0(cL)
In order to derive the formula for the optimal child allowance , we consider,
as above, the derivatives of the compensated Lagrangian with respect to that
subsidy. That derivative amounts to the e¤ect of a marginal change of  on the
Lagrangian when the change in  is compensated by a variation in T , in such a
way as to maintain the governments budget balanced.
Assuming that cross derivatives in compensated terms are negligible (i.e.
@~nE
@ =
@~nL
@ =
@~aE
@ =
@~aL
@ = 0), and using the FOCs of the laissez-faire, that
derivative can be written as:
@ ~$
@
=
@$
@
+
@$
@T
nE = Eu
0
EnE   nEEu0E +B + C   D (56)
where
B  UE   UL + (waL   zwaE)  @q
@nE
@~nE
@
+
@q
@nL
@~nL
@

C  (aE   aL)

q'0(b^E)
@~nE
@
+ (1  q)'0(b^L)@~n
L
@

D  

@~nE
@

q +

nE   nL @q
@nE

+
@~nL
@

1  q +

nE   nL @q
@nL

and where:
@~nE
@
 @n
E
@
+
@nE
@T
@T
@
=
@nE
@
+
@nE
@T
nE
@~nL
@
 @n
L
@
+
@nL
@T
@T
@
=
@nL
@
+
@nL
@T
nE
Hence the tax formula for the early births subsidy is:
 =
cov(u0E ; nE) +B + C
D
(57)
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That formula includes four terms. The rst term of the numerator is the eq-
uity term. The intuition behind that term goes as follows. A family allowance
on early births is socially desirable if rst-period consumption and rst-period
births are negatively correlated. Actually, if individuals with lower rst-period
consumption also have more early children, it makes sense, on equity grounds, to
subsidize early births, as a way to redistribute resources towards the disadvan-
taged individuals.8 The term B at the numerator gives the e¤ect of composition
(q) on overall utility and on earning tax revenue. That term reects that the
optimal subsidy on early births depends on its incidence on the long-run com-
position of the population. If the decentralized population involves a too large
proportion of late children from a social perspective, then this justies the sub-
sidization of early births, as a way to make the population closer to its optimal
structure in the long-run. The term C reects the incidence of family allowances
on the amount of LTC provided by children. In a hypothetical case where the
amounts of informal LTC provided by early and late children would be equal,
that term would vanish, since a¤ecting the timing of births would then be neu-
tral for the provision of LTC. But as early children face a lower opportunity
cost of helping their parents, we have aE   aL > 0, implying that this term is
likely to be positive. Finally, the term D is the standard e¢ ciency term. It
is also expected to be positive. Our results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 Assuming a small open economy with R = 1, and assuming
that the only available instruments are a tax on earnings  , a subsidy on early
births  and a demogrant T , we obtain that, under negligible cross derivatives,
the optimal  and the optimal  are given by:
 =
 cov(u0; y) +A
w
h
qz @~a
E
@ + (1  q)@~a
L
@
i
 =
cov(u0E ; nE) +B + C
D
8On that equity e¤ect, see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2013), who study, in a static model
with endogenous birth timing, the design of optimal family allowances when parents di¤er in
wage levels.
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where
A  @~a
E
@
h
q'0(b^E)nE + (1  q)'0(b^L)nL
i
+
@~aL
@
h
q'0(b^E)(1  nE) + (1  q)'0(b^L)(1  nL)
i
B  UE   UL + (waL   zwaE)  @q
@nE
@~nE
@
+
@q
@nL
@~nL
@

C  (aE   aL)

q'0(b^E)
@~nE
@
+ (1  q)'0(b^L)@~n
L
@

D  

@~nE
@

q +

nE   nL @q
@nE

+
@~nL
@

1  q +

nE   nL @q
@nL

Proof. See above.
In sum, our analysis of the second-best problem identies the various deter-
minants of the optimal subsidy on early births. Besides standard equity and
e¢ ciency terms, the level of the optimal subsidy on early births depends also
on the incidence of that allowance on the composition of the population, as well
as on its incidence on the amount of LTC provided to the dependent parents.
7 Conclusions
The rise of LTC and the postponement of births are two key demographic trends
of the last 40 years. This paper proposed to analyze, within a dynamic OLG
model with endogenous birth timing and old-age dependency, the formal relation
between those two phenomena.
Our results suggest that the timing of birth denitely matters for informal
LTC provision. Because of their proximity with retirement, early children face
a lower opportunity cost of providing LTC to their elderly dependent parents,
in comparison with the opportunity cost faced by late children. Thus, even
if all children have exactly the same preferences, and the same interest in the
health and the well-being of their parent, they will provide di¤erent amounts
of informal LTC, simply because they are not at the same moment in their
life, and, hence, do not face the same time constraints. Moreover, our study
of the stationary equilibrium of the economy showed that the gap in terms of
opportunity costs of providing informal LTC to the elderly does not vanish over
time, but, rather, still prevails at the stationary equilibrium.
On the normative side, we showed that, at the utilitarian optimum, it is
also the case that early children should provide more LTC than late children.
More importantly, the long-run social optimum involves a di¤erent birth timing
than the laissez-faire: it is, in general, socially desirable, for the sake of long-run
social welfare maximization, to increase the proportion of early births, and to
reduce the proportion of late births, in comparison with the laissez-faire. Thus,
in the context of LTC provision, decentralized fertility choices do not necessarily
coincide with what maximizes social interests in the long-run.
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From a policy perspective, this study recommends a di¤erentiated scal
treatment of births, depending on the age of parents. Early births should,
to some extent, be encouraged, since these allow the society to benet from
cheap informal LTC provision from children of dependents who are already
retired or close to retirement. Thus the optimal rst-best subsidy on early
births is likely to be positive, and its size depends on the extent to which the
decentralized composition of the population in the long-run di¤ers from the
socially optimal one, and on how much the decentralized provision of LTC di¤ers
from the rst-best one. We also showed that, once we restrict the set of available
scal instruments to a uniform subsidy on early births, a linear earning tax and
a demogrant, the optimal subsidy on early births still depends on its incidence
in terms of long run population composition and in terms of LTC provision, but
reects also the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity concerns.
Obviously, this paper, by focusing on the link between fertility choices and in-
formal LTC provision, left aside some important determinants of fertility choices,
in particular regarding the timing of births. As this is well-known in the lit-
erature, fertility decisions and education decisions are strongly related, in the
sense that more educated persons have, on average, children later on in their
life. Hence, the present paper does not have the pretension to cover all dimen-
sions of fertility timing choices. On the contrary, it aimed at exploring the link
between fertility timing and informal LTC provision at the old age, and showed
that having children earlier can be regarded as some form of preventive behavior
or insurance for receiving more informal LTC once dependent at the old age.
Our framework also involved other limitations. First, we focused only on
LTC provision under the form of time transfers, and, hence, we neglected any
kind of monetary aid. It should be stressed, however, that our model without
monetary transfers can, despite its simplicity, rationalize the stylized fact that
early children provide more LTC than late children. Second, our analysis kept
the retirement age as xed, whereas it could be argued that rational individuals
would also choose when they retire, depending on the LTC needs of their par-
ents.9 This extension would signicantly complicate the analysis, and is thus
left for future research. Thirdly, our analysis supposed that total fertility is
constant, and equal to the replacement fertility level. As a consequence, we
neglected "size e¤ects", i.e. the potential impact of the number of births on
LTC provision. It is not clear to see how large those size e¤ects are, but allow-
ing a varying number of births would constitute an interesting - but also more
complex - extension of our framework.
In sum, the recent demographic trends observed - the rise of LTC and the
postponement of births - raise deep challenges to both economists and policy-
makers. Given that those two trends are strongly linked, it follows that these
invite a consistent family policy aimed at dealing with these both issues in an
adequate way. The strong link between those two demographic trends of the
21st century invites a joint design of fertility policies and LTC policies.
9 In a similar vein, the retirement age could also constitute an important instrument for
policy-makers.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rst part of the proposition is obtained from the FOCs of the problems faced
by individuals of types E and L. Regarding the second part of the proposition,
this can be obtained by considering the following three cases:
 Case 1: cEt = cLt = ct. Then dEt+1 = dLt+1 = dt+1 from the FOCs for
optimal savings and nEt = n
L
t from the FOCs for optimal fertility. Hence,
from the FOC for aid, we have:
0(aEt+1) = u
0(ct)
wet+1z
Ret+1
0(aLt ) = u
0(ct)wt
Substituting for u0(ct), we have:
0(aEt+1) = 
0(aLt )
wet+1z
wtRet+1
=) aEt+1 = 0 1

0(aLt )
wet+1z
wtRet+1

Under cEt = c
L
t = ct, d
E
t+1 = d
L
t+1 = dt+1 and n
E
t = n
L
t , we obtain, from
the comparison of the budget constraints of the two types, that:
aEt+1 =
Ret+1wt
wet+1z
aLt
Collecting those things, we obtain, by transitivity of equality:
0 1

0(aLt )
wet+1z
wtRet+1

= aLt
Ret+1wt
wet+1z
which is a contradiction. Indeed, taking the transform 0 () on both sides,
we obtain:
0(aLt )
wet+1z
wtRet+1
= 0

aLt
Ret+1wt
wet+1z

which is false except when
Ret+1wt
wet+1z
= 1. Hence this case cannot arise.
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 Case 2: cEt < cLt . Then dEt+1 < dLt+1 and nEt < nLt . From the FOC for
aid, it seems that two subcases can arise: either aEt+1 > a
L
t or a
E
t+1  aLt .
But further analysis shows that only the rst subcase is possible. To show
this, rewrite the two budget constraints as follows:
wt +
wet+1z
Ret+1
 

wtn
E
t +
wet+1z((1  nEt ))
Ret+1

  wet+1z
aEt+1
Ret+1
= cEt +
dEt+1
Ret+1
wt +
wet+1z
Ret+1
 
 
wtn
L
t +
wet+1z
 
(1  nLt )

Ret+1
!
  wtaLt = cLt +
dLt+1
Ret+1
Suppose that cEt < c
L
t and a
E
t+1  aLt . Then the RHS of the second
condition is higher than the RHS of the rst condition. On the LHS,
the rst two terms are identical across conditions. Given
wet+1z
Ret+1
< wt
and nEt < n
L
t , the term in brackets term is higher, in absolute value,
in the second condition, implying that more is subtracted there. But
if aEt+1  aLt , the last term of the LHS is also larger in absolute value,
implying also that more is subtracted there. Hence, the LHS of the second
condition is unambiguously lower than the LHS of the rst condition. But
since the RHS must be, under our assumptions, unambiguously larger in
the second condition than in the rst one, a contradiction is reached. Thus
the case aEt+1  aLt cannot arise.
 Case 3: cEt > cLt . Then dEt+1 > dLt+1 and nEt > nLt . Hence, from the FOC
for aid, we obtain that aEt+1 > a
L
t . Only that case can arise.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The rst part of the proposition is obtained from the FOCs of the problems
faced by individuals of types E and L. Regarding the second part of the propo-
sition, this can be obtained by the same kind of argument as at the temporary
equilibrium. Consider the following three cases:
 Case 1: cE = cL. Then dE = dL and nE = nL. Hence, from the FOC for
aid, we obtain that aE > aL. Hence, from the FOC for aid, we have:
0(aE) = u0(c)
wz
R
0(aLt ) = u
0(ct)wt
Substituting for u0(ct), we have:
0(aE) = 0(aL)
wz
wR
=) aE = 0 1

0(aL)
wz
wR

Under cE = cL = c, dE = dL = d and nE = nL, we obtain, from the
comparison of the budget constraints of the two types, that:
aE =
Rwt
wz
aL
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Collecting those things, we obtain, by transitivity of equality:
0 1

0(aL)
z
R

= aLt
R
z
which is a contradiction. Indeed, taking the transform 0 () on both sides,
we obtain:
0(aLt )
z
R
= 0

aLt
R
z

which is false except when Rz = 1. Hence this case cannot arise.
 Case 2: cE < cL. Then dE < dL and nE < nL. From the FOC for aid,
it seems that two subcases can arise: either aE > aL or aE  aL. But
further analysis shows that only the rst subcase is possible. To show this,
rewrite the two budget constraints as follows:
w

1 +
z
R

  w

nE +
z(1  nE))
R

  wza
E
R
= cE +
dE
R
w

1 +
z
R

  w

nL +
z(1  nL)
R

  waL = cL + d
L
R
Suppose that cE < cL and aE  aL. Then the RHS of the second condi-
tion is higher than the RHS of the rst condition. On the LHS, the rst
two terms are identical across conditions. Given zR < 1 and n
E
t < n
L
t , the
term in brackets term is higher, in absolute value, in the second condition,
implying that more is subtracted there. But if aE  aL, the last term
of the LHS is also larger in absolute value, implying also that more is
substracted there. Hence, the LHS of the second condition is unambigu-
ously lower than the LHS of the rst condition. But since the RHS must
be, under our assumptions, unambiguously larger in the second condition
than in the rst one, a contradiction is reached. Thus the case aE  aL
cannot arise.
 Case 3: cE > cL. Then dE > dL and nE > nL. Hence, from the FOC for
aid, we obtain also that aE > aL.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The result regarding the capital stock is derived from the Golden Rule condition,
in comparison with R ? 1 at the laissez-faire. The di¤erence concerning the
shape of consumption proles follows from comparing the FOCs at the social
optimum and at the laissez-faire, under R ? 1 at the laissez-faire.
Regarding the amount of informal LTC provided to the dependent parent,
the FOCs are, at the laissez faire:
0(aE) = u0(cE)FL (K; ) z
FK (K; )
0(aL) = u0(cL)FL (K; )
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whereas these are, at the optimum:
0(aE) = u0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
0(aL) = u0(c)FL (K; )  '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
Provided the conditions:
u0(cE)FL (K; ) z
FK (K; ) > u
0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
u0(cL)FL (K; ) > u0(c)FL (K; )  '0
 
naE + (1  n)aL
hold, we obtain aE > aE and aL > aL.
Let us now consider fertility. At the laissez-faire, the FOC for ni was:
v0
 
ni
 v0  1  ni = u0(ci)FL (K; ) h1  z
R
i
 '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL
whereas the FOC for the socially optimal ni is:
v0(n) v0(1 n) = u
0(c)FL (K; )

 (1  z)   aL   zaE  (aE)  (aL)
 '0  naE + (1  n)aL  aE   aL
The LHS is the same. But the RHS di¤ers. Hence, provided
u0(ci)FL (K; )

1  zR

 '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL ? u
0(c)FL (K; )

 (1  z)   aL   zaE
  (aE)  (aL)
 '0  naE + (1  n)aL  aE   aL
we have: nE ? nE and nL ? nL.
9.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Once the Golden Rule capital level is reached, we have FK (K; ) = R = 1,
which automatically makes individual consumption proles at: ci = di. The
lump-sum transfers also guarantee that all consumption levels are equal across
types, i.e. cE = cL and dE = dL.
Regarding the subsidies on early births, remind that the FOC for fertility
choices becomes, under such a subsidy:
v0
 
ni
  v0  1  ni = u0(ci)FL (K; ) 1  z
FK (K; )

  u0(ci)i
 '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL
Given that the goal is to have ni satisfying:
v0(ni) v0(1 ni) = u
0(c)FL (K; ) (1  z)  u0(c)FL (K; )
 
aL   zaE
  (aE)  (aL)  '0 ()  aE   aL
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it is easy to see that the decentralization requires:
i = FL (K; )

1  z
FK (K; )

  '
0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL
u0(ci)
 

u0(c)FL (K; ) (1  z)  u0(c)FL (K; )
 
aL   zaE
  (aE)  (aL)  '0 ()  aE   aL

u0(ci)
Given that FK (K; ) = 1 thanks to intergenerational transfers, the formula can
be simplied to:
i = FL (K
; )  aL   zaE+

(aE)  (aL)+ '0  naE + (1  n)aL  aE   aL
 '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL  aE   aL
u0(c)
If some subsidies to LTC provision bring aE = aE and aL = aL (see below),
this formula can be reduced to:
i = FL (K
; )  aL   zaE+ (aE)  (aL) +
 
aE   aL  '0  naE + (1  n)aL '0  niaE + (1  ni)aL

u0(c)
Finally, regarding the aid to the parents, the FOCs would become, under a
subsidy i:
0(aE) = u0(cE)
FL (K; ) z
FK (K; )   u
0(cE)E
0(aL) = u0(cL)FL (K; )  u0(cL)L
Given that the optimal aE and aL satisfy:
0(aE) = u0(c)FL (K; ) z   '0 ()
0(aL) = u0(c)FL (K; )  '0 ()
It is straightforward to deduce, given FK (K; ) = 1:
E = L =
'0 ()
u0(c)
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